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Abstract—We model the problem of infrastructure sharing
among mobile network operators (MNOs) as a multiple-seller
single-buyer market where the MNOs are able to share their
own base stations (BSs) with each other. First, we use techniques
from stochastic geometry to find the coverage probability of the
infrastructure sharing system and analyze the trade-off between
increasing the transmit power of a BS and the BS intensity
of a buyer MNO required to achieve a given quality-of-service
(QoS) in terms of the coverage probability. We also analyze the
power consumption of the network per unit area (i.e., areal power
consumption) and show that it is a piecewise continuous function
composed of a linear and a convex functions. We show that
when the transmit power of the BSs and/or the BS intensity of a
network increases, the system becomes interference limited and
the coverage probability tends to saturate at a certain value.
As such, when the required QoS is set above this bound, an
MNO can improve its coverage by buying infrastructure from
other MNOs. Subsequently, we analyze the strategy of a buyer
MNO on choosing how many MNOs and which MNOs to buy
the infrastructure from. The optimal strategy of the buyer is
given by greedy fractional knapsack algorithm. On the sellers’
side, the pricing and the fraction of infrastructure to be sold are
formulated using a Cournot oligopoly game.
Index Terms—Infrastructure sharing, stochastic geometry, cov-
erage probability, areal power, oligopoly market, Cournot game.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the concept of network infrastructure shar-
ing has been investigated to address two kinds of concerns. On
the one hand, with the growing demand for mobile services,
the under utilization of dedicated spectrum auctioned off to the
mobile network operators (MNOs) has become a bottleneck
for the future growth of the industry [1]. While on the other
hand, in areas or time periods where demand can be low, such
as in rural areas or developing countries, or during night time,
the high cost of network infrastructure forces the operators to
charge high prices from their customers, making the mobile
services unaffordable to most people, hence further driving
down the demand [2], [3].
One possible paradigm to address these issues is to allow
the MNOs to share their infrastructures in order to maximize
the use of existing network resources while simultaneously
minimizing the cost and resources [2], [4]. It also allows
for a faster deployment of network services. Such sharing of
infrastructure can be passive or active: Passive sharing refers
to the sharing of physical space, such as buildings, sites, and
masts. In active sharing, active elements of the network such
as antennas, spectrum, entire base stations, or even elements
of core network are shared. Thus, such active sharing allows
mobile roaming, which allows an MNO to make use of another
network in a place where it has no coverage or infrastructure
of its own.
There has been a growing number of work dedicated to
investigate this issue. In [5], hardware demonstration of the
benefit of inter-operator spectrum sharing was demonstrated.
In [6], infrastructure sharing was studied with full and partial
coverage provisioning. A real-world multi-operator mobile
network with infrastructure sharing was also shown to reduce
significantly the number of base stations required to provide
mobile service and improve coverage. In [7], stochastic geom-
etry was used to investigate infrastructure sharing, spectrum
sharing, and the combination of two. When both types of
sharing is allowed, the authors showed that a trade-off existed
between coverage and data rate performance. In [8], the
authors also exploited stochastic geometry to study the trade-
off involved in spectrum sharing and infrastructure sharing.
We consider multiple co-located deployment of network
infrastructures by different MNOs, where the MNOs are
assumed to operate over orthogonal frequency bands. In the
infrastructure sharing deployment, each base station (BS) can
be utilized by the users subscribed to more than one MNO.
The MNO that installs the BS is considered as a potential
seller of the BS infrastructure. This is the incumbent MNO.
The entrant MNOs that use the BS of the incumbent MNO
to serve its mobile user equipment (UE) are considered as the
buyers. In the presence of multiple seller MNOs, it is assumed
that they compete with each other to sell their infrastructure
to a potential buyer. Our study only focuses on the sharing
of infrastructure among the MNOs, that is, the MNOs do not
share their spectrum.
In this paper, we consider the scenario where there are
multiple seller MNOs and one buyer MNO. In this case, we
study the strategy of a buyer MNO, that decides which MNOs
to buy the infrastructure from, and how much infrastructure
to buy from them. We propose a cost minimization problem
for the buyer MNO, while guaranteeing the quality-of-service
(QoS) to its UEs, in terms of the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) coverage probability, as a fractional
knapsack problem. Since there is a single buyer in the market,
the competition among the buyers is not considered here.
Next, we consider the market from the point of view of the
sellers which compete with each other to sell the infrastructure.
We model the competition among the seller MNOs as a
Cournot-Nash game. The seller MNOs compete with each
other in terms of their supply (a fraction of infrastructure to be
shared), the cost associated (e.g., due to power consumption
at the BSs), and the selling price with the objective to gain
the highest profit. As such we find the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium and obtain the equilibrium price. We use results from
stochastic geometric analysis of large-scale cellular networks
to evaluate SINR outage probability and power consumption
to model such market.
The major contributions of the paper are as follows:
• The paper presents an infrastructure sharing model with
multiple seller MNOs and a single buyer MNO. The
downlink SINR coverage probability, which is considered
to be the QoS metric for the buyer MNO, is analyzed
using stochastic geometry. Subsequently, the tradeoff
between the transmission power of a BS and the BS
deployment density for the buyer MNO is analyzed. Also,
for a seller MNO, since its profit depends on its cost
of network operation, the areal power consumption (i.e.,
power consumption per unit area) at the BSs is analyzed.
• The optimal strategy for the buyer MNO, in order to
minimize the cost of purchase, is obtained by solving
a fractional knapsack problem.
• The optimal strategy for the seller MNOs, in terms of
the fraction of infrastructure to be shared and the pricing
for the infrastructure, is obtained as the equilibrium of a
Cournot-Nash game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model. Section III gives the stochastic
geometrical analysis of the SINR outage probability of a
typical user based on which the trade-off between BS transmit
power and BS deployment is analyzed. Section IV analyzes the
strategic behavior of a buyer MNO to buy infrastructure from
multiple seller MNOs. Section V analyzes the competition
among multiple sellers using a Cournot-Nash game. The
numerical results are presented in Section VI before the paper
is concluded in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Consider a system with K + 1 MNOs given by the set
K = {0, 1, . . . ,K} to serve a common geographical area. We
consider a single-buyer multiple-seller market for infrastruc-
ture sharing. Let MNO-0 denote our buyer MNO. Let the set
of BSs owned by MNO-k be given by Fk, where k ∈ K.
Each of the BSs and user equipments (UEs) is assumed to
be equipped with a single antenna. The maximum transmit
power of each BS is pmax. Also, a UE subscribing to an
MNO associates to the nearest BS belonging to that MNO.
The BSs owned by different MNOs are spatially distributed
according to homogeneous Poisson point processes (PPPs). Let
the spatial intensity of BSs per unit area of MNO-k be denoted
by λk, where k ∈ K. Furthermore, each MNO-k, k ∈ K, is
assumed to operate on orthogonal spectrum. Thus, there is no
inter-operator interference among the MNOs.
During the sharing of infrastructure, we assume the follow-
ing statements to hold:
Assumption 1. When the buyer MNO-0 is allowed to use the
infrastructure of a seller MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, the UEs
of MNO-0 associates with the nearest available BSs owned by
MNO-0 or the seller MNO-k.
Assumption 2. The buyer MNO-0 is assumed to use the
infrastructure, but not the spectrum, belonging to a seller
MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}. As such a UE of MNO-0 served
by the shared BS of a seller MNO-k has to operate on the
spectrum belonging to the MNO-0 itself. Since the seller MNO
operates on a different spectrum, the shared BSs of the seller
do not add extra interference to the UEs of MNO-0.1
If the buyer MNO-0 shares infrastructure with N ⊆ K\{0}
seller MNOs, then a UE subscribing to MNO-0 can effectively
associate to any one of the enlarged set of BSs given by F =
F0 ∪ (∪i∈NFi). This implies that the net BS intensity that a
typical UE of MNO-0 will find itself in is
λ = λ0 +
∑
i∈N
λi, (1)
due to the superposition property of PPP. Note that despite
the sharing of BSs among MNOs, there is no inter-operator
interference among MNOs in our system model, since each
MNO operates over a separate spectrum. Due to Assumption
2, the buyer will purchase only the infrastructure of the seller
MNO and not the spectrum.
III. SINR COVERAGE AND TRADEOFF BETWEEN
TRANSMISSION POWER AND BS DEPLOYMENT
A. SINR Coverage Probability
Without loss of generality, we will consider a typical UE
of MNO-0 to be located at the origin, which associates with
the nearest BS in the enlarged set of BSs given by F . We
will denote the nearest BS from F to the typical UE as BS-
0. We assume that the message signal undergoes Rayleigh
fading with the channel gain given by g0. Furthermore, let
α > 2 denote the path-loss exponent for the path-loss model
r−α0 , where r0 is the distance between the typical UE and BS-
0. Finally, let σ2 denote the noise variance and p denote the
transmit power of all the BSs in MNO-0, including BS-0. The
downlink SINR at the typical UE is
SINR =
g0r
−α
0 p
I + σ2
. (2)
Here I =
∑
i∈F0\{0} gir
−α
i p is the interference experienced
by a typical UE only from the BSs that operate on the spectrum
of MNO-0. These are the BSs that belong only to MNO-0
itself. Here gi is the co-channel gain between typical UE and
interfering BS-i and ri is the distance between the typical UE
and the interfering BS-i, where i ∈ F0\{0}. The transmit
power of each BS is 0 < p ≤ pmax.
Given a detection threshold T , if SINR < T the UE is said
to experience an outage. Likewise, if SINR > T , then the UE
1We assume that the MNO-0’s users activity in seller MNOs is low and
can be neglected.
is said to have coverage. The SINR coverage probability for
a typical UE of MNO-0’s cellular network is defined as
Pc = Pr(SINR > T ). (3)
In [9, Theorem 1], the authors derived a formula for
the coverage probability of a typical UE when the BS are
distributed according to a homogeneous PPP of intensity λ as
given by
Pc = πλ
∫ ∞
0
exp{−(Az +Bzα/2)}dz, (4)
where A = πλβ and B = Tσ
2
p , and
β =
2(T/p)2/α
α
Eg[g
2/α(Γ(−2/α, T g/p))− Γ(−2/α)].
When the interfering links undergo Rayleigh fading, β = 1+
ρ(T, α), where
ρ(T, α) = T 2/α
∫ ∞
T−2/α
(1 + uα/2)−1du. (5)
For this special case, we see that β is independent of transmit
power.
However, for our system, due to the fact that the interference
does not scale with the BS intensity, we have to modify the
above formula. We can proceed in a manner similar to the
proof of [9, Theorem 1] and show that a more general coverage
formula is given as follows:
Proposition 1. The coverage probability of a typical UE of
buyer MNO-0 under the Assumptions 1 and 2 is
Pc = πλ
∫ ∞
0
exp{−(A′z +Bzα/2)}dz, (6)
where A′ = π(λ − λ0(1 − β)) and λ = λ0 +
∑
i∈N λi such
that N ⊆ K\{0}. Here B and β are the same as in (4).
Proof: Proceed in a manner similar to the proof of [9,
Theorem 1], keeping in mind that interference is contributed
only from BSs of MNO-0, while BS association is contributed
by all MNOs in N .
Corollary 1. When there is no infrastructure sharing, N = ∅,
(6) reduces to (4).
Except for α = 4, the integral for Pc cannot be evaluated
in closed form. Nevertheless, a simple closed-form approxi-
mation for the general case, where α > 2, and where both
noise and intra-operator interference are present, can be given
as [10, Eqn. 4]
Pc ≃ πλ
[
A′ +
α
2
B2/α
Γ
(
2
α
)
]−1
. (7)
Proposition 2. Let N = |N |. Then, (i) for fixed N ,
limλ0→∞ Pc = 1/β, (ii) for fixed λ0, if limN→∞
∑
i∈N λi =
∞, then limN→∞ Pc = 1, (iii) for fixed N , if λ0 = 0, then
Pc ≃
[
1 + α
2πΓ( 2α )
B2/α∑
i∈N λi
]−1
.
Proof: (i) From the approximation in (7), we see that as
λ0 →∞, since B and
∑N
i=0 λk remains constant, Pc → 1/β.
(ii) Again from the approximation (7), since B and λ0(1−β)
are constants, Pc → 1. (iii) When λ0 = 0, A′ = π
∑
i∈N λi.
Simplifying (7), we obtain the desired result.
In our case, the increase in BS intensity does not correspond
with the increase in co-channel interference, which is different
from [9]. Proposition 2 also confirms our intuition that greater
sharing of infrastructure leads to better coverage. However,
paradoxically, increasing one’s own infrastructure leads to
degrading of performance.
B. Minimum Transmit Power Required to Satisfy the QoS
Let us further assume that the MNO-0 wants to ensure that
the coverage probability of a typical UE satisfies the QoS
constraint
Pc ≥ 1− ǫ, (8)
where 0 < ǫ < 1 is some arbitrary value.
In order to satisfy the coverage constrain in (8), the min-
imum power required for each BS of MNO-0, for given
infrastructure, is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that the interfering links undergo
Rayleigh fading and λ be defined as before. Then, given that
1 − ǫ < 1/β′, where β′ = 1 − λ0(1 − β)/λ, the minimum
transmit power required for each BS of MNO-0 such that
Pc ≥ 1− ǫ, is
p ≃ cλ−α/2, (9)
where c =
[
2π(1−(1−ǫ)β′)
α(1−ǫ)(Tσ2)2/αΓ(
2
α )
]−α/2
.
Proof: When the interfering links undergo Rayleigh fad-
ing, β = 1 + ρ, as given in (5), and is independent of p.
Thus, using (7) in the inequality Pc ≥ 1 − ǫ, and solving for
p, we obtain the desired result. For p > 0, it suffices that
1 − (1 − ǫ)β′ > 0 in the expression for c. Re-arranging the
terms gives the sufficient condition.
In Proposition 3, note that 1/β′ ≥ 1/β.
C. Trade-off Between Power and Infrastructure
Every MNO wishes to guarantee a certain probability of
coverage to its own customers. For this purpose, if a UE is
experiencing outage, the MNO can either choose to increase
the transmit power of the BSs so as to increase the coverage
radius, or offload the call to a shared BS. It is natural to
wonder at the possible trade-off between increasing the power
and sharing more infrastructure. The answer was provided by
Proposition 3.
Intuitively, in Proposition 3, the minimum required transmit
power decreases with increasing BS densification. As for
the sufficiency condition, 1/β′ is the maximum attainable
coverage probability as transmit power p → ∞ and as the
system becomes interference limited, B → 0. That is, we
have the upper bound Pc ≤ 1/β′. Thus, the QoS, 1 − ǫ,
can be achieved by varying the transmit power only when
1 − ǫ < 1/β′. If this condition is violated, the QoS cannot
be satisfied by simply varying the transmit power, and MNO-
0 will have to buy more infrastructure from other MNOs. A
few special cases are worth mentioning: (1) For fixed N , if
λ0 → ∞, then β′ → β. (2) For fixed λ0, if λ → ∞, then
β′ → 1.
Let R be the cell radius of a BS defined as the distance at
which a UE will receive −3 dB SNR. Then, for the important
special case when there is no infrastructure sharing, we have
the following scaling law as a corollary.
Corollary 2. When there is no infrastructure sharing, the
minimum BS transmit power for which Pc ≥ 1 − ǫ is
p ≃ cλ−α/20 , where c is independent of λ0. Also, the optimal
cell radius is R ≃ c′√
λ
, where c′ = (2c/σ2)1/α.
Proof: From Proposition 3, since N = ∅, we have λ =
λ0 and β
′ = β. Also, since the cell edge is defined as the
distance at which SNR is −3 dB, we have pR−ασ2 = 12 . Putting
p = cλ
−α/2
0 , we can solve for R to obtain the result.
A scaling law similar to Corollary 2 can be found in [11,
Lemma 1] and [12, Lemma 1] for homogeneous PPP, using
a slightly different approximation, as p ∝ λ−α/2+10 . However,
our formula differs from theirs in the order of the exponent as
well as the proportionality constant. Likewise, the scaling law
for the cell radius, R ∝ 1/√λ0, corresponds to that obtained
by [13] for hexagonal grid model.
D. Areal Power Consumption
Let the transmit power of each BS belonging to the seller
MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, be denoted by pk. Apart from
the transmit power, each BS also consumes a fixed amount
of circuit power, denoted by pc. Hence, the total power
consumption of a BS of an MNO-k is pk+pc. Since the MNO-
k has λk BS per unit area, the areal power consumption of
the network (i.e., power consumption per unit area) is
Sk = λk(pk + pc). (10)
For MNO-k, let the QoS constaint on coverage probability
of a typical UE be Pc ≥ 1− ǫ and the threshold SINR be Tk.
In order to satisfy this constrain, it can either increase its BS
intensity λk or increase its transmit power pk. The trade-off
between λk and pk was given by Proposition 3. Similarly, the
trade-off between λk and Sk follow immediately.
Proposition 4. Given the assumptions in Proposition 3, areal
power consumption of seller MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, is
Sk(λk) =
{
λk(pmax + pc), if 0 ≤ λk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α,
λk(ckλ
−α/2
k + pc), if λk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α,
(11)
where ck =
[
2π(1−(1−ǫ)β)
α(1−ǫ)(Tkσ2)2/αΓ(
2
α )
]−α/2
.
Proof: Since the MNO-k does not buy infrastructure from
other MNOs, the net BS intensity that a typical UE of MNO-
k experiences is λk. Thus, from Corollary 2, we have pk ≃
ckλ
−α/2
k . Putting pk in (10) and recalling that 0 < pk ≤ pmax,
we have (11).
We see that Sk is a piece-wise continuous function of λk.
The Sk initially increases linearly with λk. Beyond a certain
point, Sk behaves as a convex function. This can be verified
by checking the second derivative of Sk for λk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α
as
d2Sk
dλ2k
=
ckα(α− 2)
4
λ
−α
2
−1
k .
Since ck > 0 and α > 2, we have
d2Sk
dλ2k
> 0, proving
the convexity of Sk in the region λk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α. As
such, studying the behaviour of Sk is not straightforward.
Nevertheless, the local minima in the convex region can be
found.
Proposition 5. Given the assumptions in Proposition 3, let
λth = (
ck
Pmax
)2/α. Then, for the region λk ≥ λth, the BS
intensity for which the areal power consumption of MNO-k,
where k ∈ K\{0}, is minimum is
λk,min = max
(
λth,
[
ck
pc
(α
2
− 1
)]2/α)
. (12)
Proof: We have dSk/dλk = pc − (ck(α − 2)λ−α/2k )/2.
Solving dSk/dλk = 0 for λk , we have λ
∗
k = [
ck
pc
(α2 − 1)]2/α.
This is clearly the minima if λth < λ
∗
k. Otherwise, λk,min =
λth.
λk
S k
(λ
k)
λth = (ck/pmax)
2/α
Sk = λk(ck λk
-α/2
 + p
c
)
λk
*
= [(ck/ pc)(α/2 -1)]
2/αSk = λk(pmax + pc)
Fig. 1. The areal power consumption (Sk) versus BS intensity (λk).
In Fig. 1, we illustrate Sk as a function of λk, as given
in (11). We can see that it is composed of linear and convex
parts. The convex part of Sk corresponds to that obtained for
hexagonal grid models via simulations in [15]. Similar, but not
the same, formulas have been given in [11], [12].
IV. BUYER’S STRATEGY
In this section, we propose a strategy for the buyer MNO-
0 which will allow it to choose the seller MNOs to buy the
infrastructure from. By using our method, the buyer MNO will
select the minimum number of seller MNOs, at minimum cost,
such that it can serve its UEs guaranteeing some QoS. We first
have the following proposition:
Proposition 6. For the QoS condition Pc ≥ 1−ǫ to be feasible
for the buyer MNO-0, the net BS intensity λ = λ0+
∑
i∈N λi
must satisfy
λ ≥ 1− ǫ
ǫ
(γ − λ0(1− β)), (13)
where γ = α2π
B2/α
Γ
(
2
α
) , for some N such that ∅ ⊆ N ⊆ K.
Proof: Using the approximation (7) in (8) and solving for
λ, we have required result.
If there is no cost attached to the infrastructure sharing, or
if the cost of buying infrastructure from all the seller MNOs is
the same, then the QoS constrain (8) can be easily satisfied by
selecting the N MNOs with largest BS intensities λi such that
(13) is satisfied. This greedy approach thus gives the required
MNOs from whom to buy the infrastructure from. However,
if there is a cost associated with the sharing of infrastructure,
then we can formulate a cost minimization problem with the
QoS constraint, which can be written as a linear program as
follows:
min
∑
k∈K\{0}
qkxk (14)
s.t. (C1)
∑
k∈K\{0}
λkxk ≥ 1− ǫ
ǫ
(γ − λ0(1 − β))− λ0,
where qk is the price of infrastructure when buying from
MNO-k, where k ∈ K\{0}, and xk (0 ≤ xk ≤ 1) denotes
the fraction of infrastructure bought from seller MNO-k. We
can interpret xk in two possible ways: 1) The buyer MNO-0
buys the entire infrastructure of MNO-k but utilizes the whole
infrastructure of MNO-k for only xk fraction of time, 2) the
MNO-0 buys only a fraction xk of the total infrastructure of
MNO-k, but utilizes it all the time.
The problem in (14) is an instance of a knapsack problem. In
the knapsack interpretation of problem (14), the seller MNOs
are interpreted as “items”, their BS intensities are interpreted
as “weights”, and the right hand term of constrain (C1) is
interpreted as “weight capacity” of a “bag”. Likewise, qk is
interpreted as the “value” of the k-th “item”. Since xk ∈ [0, 1],
the problem (14) becomes a fractional knapsack problem, and
a greedy algorithm can be used to obtain the optimal solution
[14, Chap 17.1].
The greedy algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. The
idea behind this greedy algorithm is as follows: We first sort
the seller MNOs according to their cost per BS intensity
in ascending order. We then select an MNO in that order
if its weight (the BS intensity) is less than or equal to the
residual weight capacity of the knapsack. In our case, the
maximum weight capacity of knapsack is defined by w¯ =
1−ǫ
ǫ (γ − λ0(1 − β))−λ0. If the BS intensity exceeds w¯, then
the buyer MNO-0 buys only a fraction of the infrastructure
from the remaining seller MNOs. Hence, we can define the
variable xk as
xk =
{
1, if λi ≤ w¯ − w
(w¯−w)
λi
, if λi > w¯ − w, (15)
where w is the weight in the knapsack thus far.
V. SELLERS’ COMPETITION: PRICING OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
In this part, we will study the equilibrium pricing due to
the sellers competition as well as the optimal fraction of
Algorithm 1 Fractional Knapsack Algorithm
1: Initialize xk = 0, w = 0, and V = 0
2: Compute ρk = qk/λk
3: Sort the sellers by ρk in ascending order such that ρπ1 ≤
ρπ2 · · · ≤ ρπK
4: for i = 1 to K do
5: if λπi ≤ w¯ − w then
6: xπi = 1
7: V = V + qπi
8: w = w + λπi
9: else
10: xπi =
w¯−w
λpii
11: V = V + qπiyπi
12: Terminate
13: end if
14: end for
infrastructure that the seller MNOs will be willing to sell.
We will formulate the seller competition as a Cournot-Nash
oligopoly game [16].
Let the fraction of infrastructure to be sold from the seller
MNO-k, k ∈ K\{0}, be zk, where 0 ≤ zk ≤ 1. Then, the
total amount of infrastructure sold by the seller MNO-k is
yk = λkzk. Let the cost of operating its infrastructure be
Ck(yk), which we can define as
Ck(yk) = akSk(yk) + dk, (16)
where ak is the price of areal power consumption, dk is a
fixed operation cost, and Sk is as given in (11).
Let the overall infrastructure from K seller MNOs available
in the market be denoted by y =
∑K
k=1 yk. Also, let us denote
the fraction of infrastructure of all MNOs except MNO-k by
y−k = y − yk. Let the selling price of the infrastructure be
Q(y). The price functionQ(y) is assumed to be monotonically
increasing with the total supply of infrastructure, in accordance
to the “law of supply”. We will assume Q(y) to be
Q(y) = θ + ηy, (17)
where θ is the initial installation price of infrastructure from
all seller MNOs and η denotes the marginal price of the total
infrastructure y in the market. Thus, the MNO-k’s profit is
Fk(y1, . . . , yk) = ykQ(y)− Ck(yk). (18)
In order to maximize the profit of MNO-k with respect to
yk, we first partial differentiate (18) with respect to yk, and
noting that ∂y/∂yk = 1, we obtain
∂Fk
∂yk
= yk
dQ
dy
+Q− dCk
dyk
. (19)
Using the optimality condition ∂Fk∂yk
= 0 in (19) and solving
for yk, we obtain
yk =
1
dQ
dy
(
dCk
dyk
−Q
)
, (20)
which is in a fixed-point form. Let us denote the function at
the right hand side of (20) by BRk(y−k) ≡ 1dQ
dy
(
dCk
dyk
−Q
)
,
which we referred to as the best response of MNO-k to the
action of other competitive sellers.
Here we have dQdy = η, and
dCk
dyk
=
{
ak(pmax + pc), if 0 ≤ yk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α
ak(1− α2 )cky−α/2k + akpc, if yk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α.
We see that the marginal cost of MNO-k is constant up
until a certain point, after which the marginal cost starts to
monotonically increase. Thus, the action of MNO-k to sell yk
amount of infrastructure depends on the action of other MNOs,
as given by the equation yk = BRk(y−k). Substituting dCkdyk ,
dQ
dy and Q in (20), and recalling that y = yk+ y−k, we obtain
the best response of MNO-k as
yk =
{
Uk
2 − y−k2 , if 0 ≤ yk ≤ ( ckpmax )2/α
Vky
−α/2
k
2 +
Wk
2 − y−k2 , if yk ≥ ( ckpmax )2/α,
(21)
where Uk =
ak(pmax+pc)−θ
η , Vk =
ak(1−α2 )ck
η and Wk =
akpc−θ
η .
The equilibrium solution of the Cournot-Nash oligopoly
market, y∗, is the fixed point of the best response
function. As such, the best responses of all K seller
MNOs can be expressed in vector form as y∗ =
BR(y∗), where y∗ = [y∗1 , y
∗
2 , . . . , y
∗
K ]
T and BR(y∗) =
[BR1(y
∗
−1),BR2(y
∗
−2), . . . ,BRK(y
∗
−K)]
T . The [.]T denotes
transpose of vector. By taking summation of (21) over all
K seller MNOs, and using the fact that
∑
k∈K\{0} y−k =∑
k∈K\{0}(y− yk) = (K− 1)y, we can analytically solve the
equilibrium quantity y∗ as
y∗ =


∑
k∈K\{0} Uk
K+1 , 0 ≤ y∗k ≤ ( ckpmax )
2
α
∑
k∈K\{0}(Vk(y
∗
k)
−α/2+Wk)
K+1 , y
∗
k ≥ ( ckpmax )
2
α .
(22)
Once the equilibrium quantity y∗ is computed, we can find
the corresponding equilibrium price q∗ by substituting y∗ into
the price function in (17), we get q∗ = Q(y∗).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We assume that the BSs are spatially distributed according
to homogeneous PPP inside a circular area of 500 meter radius
for allK+1MNOs. The seller MNOs are assumed to have the
same intensity of BSs per unit area. The maximum transmit
power of each BS is pmax = 10 dBm, the SINR threshold at
each user is Tk = 15 dB, the path-loss exponent is α = 4,
and noise σ2 = −120 dBm.
A. Effect of Changing the Outage QoS
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the fraction of infrastructure bought
by MNO-0 while increasing the values of tolerable outage
probability ǫ (i.e. Pc ≥ 1 − ǫ). Each BS from all MNOs
are assumed to transmit at its the maximum power. We also
assume that the price of infrastructure qk is the same for
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Fig. 2. The fractional x for
∑
K
i=1
xi versus the tolerable outage probability.
all sellers. The fractional variable x =
∑K
i=1 xi indicates
the proportion of infrastructure that MNO-0 has bought. We
see that for low values of ǫ, MNO-0 cannot satisfy the
required QoS solely through own infrastructure. In this figure,
the MNO-0 needs to buy infrastructure from all the sellers.
When ǫ increases beyond a certain value, x starts to decrease,
indicating that at higher ǫ MNO-0 buys less infrastructure.
B. Effect of Changing the BS Intensity of MNO-0
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Fig. 3. The coverage probability of user of MNO-0 before and after buying
infrastructure.
In Fig. 3, the difference between coverage probability of the
buyer MNO-0 before and after buying infrastructure is shown.
Each BS of every MNOs transmits at maximum power. We
assume that the number of seller MNOs is K = 5 and that all
of them have same BSs intensity. Before buying infrastructure,
it can be seen that the Pc of MNO-0 approaches 1/β as λ0
increases. The MNO-0 cannot simply increase its own BS
intensity to achieve a coverage more than the upper bound
1/β, as we proved in Proposition 2 (i). The MNO-0 will
have to buy more infrastructure to gain more coverage. After
buying infrastructure from all five MNOs, we see that the
coverage of MNO-0 improves and is greater than 1/β. For
fixed λ0, when the BS intensity of seller MNO-k, k ∈ K\{0},
increases, the coverage of MNO-0 also increases. This verifies
Proposition 2 (ii). Also, for fixed λk, where k ≥ 1, as λ0
increases, the coverage of MNO-0 decreases, in accordance to
Proposition 2 (i).
C. The Market Equilibrium Price and Quantity
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium quantity (y∗) with y1 and y2.
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium Price (q∗) with y∗
1
and y∗
2
.
The market equilibrium quantity and price are illustrated
in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. We consider two seller MNOs, where
the best response of seller MNO-1 to the action of the MNO-
2 and vice versa can be obtained from (21). In Fig. 4, we
have plotted the equilibrium quantity y∗ from (22) with respect
to y∗1 and y
∗
2 . We observe that for fixed y
∗, the equilibrium
contour lines for large y∗1 and y∗2 are hyperbolas. Fig. 5 shows
the equilibrium price with respect to y∗1 and y
∗
2 . The contour
lines of equilibrium price gives a single equilibrium price
solutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the infrastructure trading problem for multiple
seller MNOs and one buyer MNO using stochastic geometry.
We first analyzed the coverage probability of the buyer MNO,
and studied the trade-offs between buying of infrastructure and
increasing of transmit power. We then focused on the strategy
of buyer and the competition between sellers. We provided the
strategy of a buyer MNO on choosing how many MNOs and
which MNOs to buy infrastructure from in order to satisfy the
QoS. The strategy of the buyer was formulated as a fractional
knapsack problem and the optimal solution was found via
greedy algorithm. The pricing and fraction of infrastructure
that sellers are willing to sell is formulated using Cournot-
Nash oligopoly game. One major conclusion is: infrastructure
sharing can improve cellular coverage.
This work can be extended in several directions: 1) in
addition to infrastructure sharing, spectrum sharing can be also
considered, 2) multiple buyer MNOs can be considered where
they compete with each other to obtain their demand with
lowest price, in addition to the seller competition.
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